An analytic ombudsperson could:
hear complaints from disgruntled employees
resolve disputes
investigate allegations of politicization and
promote “analytic integrity” and ideals such as objectivity.
If Canada had an analytic ombudsman, perhaps the anonymous "national security official" who leaked classified information to the Globe and Mail in March 2023 on Chinese foreign interfernce in Canada would have pursued their grievance internally, rather than publicly.
As to settling disputes, an ombudsman could help by providing an independent opinon. I once had to defend a young analyst who had raised concerns about the reliability of a human source. His boss had asked me to "discredit" his analysis because it was going to impede the acquisition of a warrant ("The judge won't grant it if he has doubts about the source."). I found that the analyst had raised valid concerns. "You can't sweep this under the rug," I told the manager. "You have to deal with it."
I tell this story not only because I believe analysts in the Canadian IC need someone they can go to when they are being bullied, but because our IC needs someone to uphold analytic standards and fight against politicization.
In the US, this role is performed by the IC Analytic Ombudsman, a role created in 2018 by the DNI under the authority of the IRTPA. Until 2021, the position was filled by Dr. Barry Zulauf. He describes his role in Safeguarding Objectivity in Intelligence Analysis (Studies in Intelligence Vol. 65, No. 3).
It seems that Canada's closest equivalent to the position of US IC analytic ombudsman is the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner. However, the Canadian Forces, CSIS and CSE are not covered by the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act.
It could be argued that our present system is good enough. Leaks and politicization are rare, after all. That overlooks the role an ombudsman would have in professionalizing analysis, especially if situated within the office of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA).
Good points, Jim. Here are my responses.
An ombudsman would erode the chain of command and encourage disloyalty.
I will concede that having an Ombudsman does provide analysts with the ability to do an “end run” around their supervisor, but I don’t think this would be abused. Filing a complaint with the Ombudsman would likely be a “career limiting move” and a last resort after exhausting all internal mechanisms. As to disloyalty, that is a harsh term for essentially going to a third party (the Ombudsman) to get a second opinion.
An Ombudsman would promote “intelligence arrogance”.
Analysts should stand up for what they believe and have the courage of their convictions. Far from being arrogant,…
I thank John for raising this issue, but for the sake of argument, let me adopt an opposing view. I do not think we need an independent analytic ombudsman. I have for reasons for thinking so.
First, I think the concept of an independent ombudsman for anything erodes the integrity, responsibility, and accountability inherent in the 'chain of command.' I think it generates a degree of disloyalty in what should be an honourable profession. In the case of PCO intelligence analysts, the IAS head, and ultimately the NSIA are responsible and accountable for the quality of intelligence assessments produced. It is up to them to establish appropriate processes and systems, under their control, to produce the highest quality products, all…